

The tug-of-war without noise and the infinity Laplacian in a wedge

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Frontier Probability Days

(joint work with Dante DeBlassie)

May 18, 2014

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
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


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
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
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


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- If $\eta > \eta_p$, then for each strategy of player II, there are arbitrarily small stepsizes, along with corresponding $x_0 \in W_\eta$ and strategy for player I such that

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The upper bound is weak, while the lower bound is what we believe is the correct behavior. The fact that $p < \infty$ gives some smoothness to solutions.

Tug of War without noise a la (Peres-Schramm-Sheffield-Wilson)

$$\Delta_{\infty} u = |\nabla u|^{-2} \left[\sum_{i,j=1}^n \frac{\partial^2 u}{\partial x_i \partial x_j} \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_i} \frac{\partial u}{\partial x_j} \right].$$

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The game position is initially at a point $x_0 \in D$ and at each play, a fair coin is tossed.

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Use x_k to denote the game position at the k^{th} step and we will make the convention that if $x_k \notin W$, then $x_\ell = x_k$ for all $\ell \geq k$.

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
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
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
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
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Upto exiting D the token follows

$$x_{k+1} = x_k + f_{k+1} + g_{k+1}.$$

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Theorem 1: If τ is the time to end the game, then for any starting point $x_0 \in W_\eta$,

$$\begin{aligned} E_{x_0}[\tau] < \infty & \quad \text{if} \quad \eta < \frac{\pi}{3}, \\ E_{x_0}[\tau] = \infty & \quad \text{if} \quad \eta > \frac{\pi}{3}. \quad \square \end{aligned}$$


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
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If $\pi \leq \eta < 2\pi$ then by the max-min nature of the game reduces to computing a random walk on a half line which is infinite.

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
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
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
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


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In figure above, line ℓ_1 is through x_0 perpendicular to the upper boundary of the wedge.

Also ℓ_2 is the horizontal line lying $\epsilon \cos \frac{\eta}{2}$ units above the x -axis.

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$$\begin{aligned} E_{N\epsilon}[\tau] &= \sum_{n=N}^{\infty} E_{N\epsilon}[\tau | G_n] P_{N\epsilon}(G_n) \\ &= \sum_{n=N}^{\infty} \left[\sum_{j=N}^{n-1} E_{N\epsilon}[\tau_{j+1} - \tau_j | G_n] + E_{N\epsilon}[\tau - \tau_n | G_n] \right] P_{N\epsilon}(G_n), \end{aligned} \tag{3}$$

Lemma: For some positive A_1 and A_2 , both depending only on ϵ and η , for $n \geq N + 1$, with τ being the time to end the game,

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Finally the bounds for $P_{N\epsilon} (G_n)$ are straightforward and imply Theorem 1

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$$\begin{aligned}\Delta_{\infty} u &= -1 & \text{in } & W_{\eta} \setminus \{(x, y) \in \mathbb{R}^2 : y = 0\} \\ u &= 0 & \text{on } & \partial W_{\eta},\end{aligned}$$

$u(x) = r^2 f(\theta)$, where f is even, $f > 0$ on $(-\frac{\eta}{2}, \frac{\eta}{2})$, $f(\pm\frac{\eta}{2}) = 0$, $f' < 0$ on $(0, \frac{\eta}{2})$, $f' > 0$ on $(-\frac{\eta}{2}, 0)$, $f'(0) = 0$ and

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$$f \in C\left(\left[-\frac{\eta}{2}, \frac{\eta}{2}\right]\right) \cap C^{1,1/3}\left(\left[-\frac{\eta}{2}, \frac{\eta}{2}\right]\right) \cap C^{\infty}\left(\left[-\frac{\eta}{2}, \frac{\eta}{2}\right] \setminus \{0\}\right).$$

Theorem 2: If

$$\eta < \pi \left[1 - \frac{\sqrt{2}}{2} \right],$$

then there is $\epsilon_0 > 0$ and a strategy for player II such that the time τ to end the game in W_η satisfies

$$\sup_{S_I} \sup_{0 < \epsilon < \epsilon_0} \epsilon^2 E_{x_0}[\tau] < \infty, \quad x_0 \in W_\eta,$$

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so we take G a small neighborhood of the axis and use $\Delta_\infty u = -1$ in the classical sense away from G

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now optional stopping leads immediately to

$$\sup_{S_I} \sup_{0 < \epsilon < \epsilon_1} \epsilon^2 E_{x_0}[\tau] < \infty, \quad x_0 \in W,$$

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We show $\tau_B \leq \tau_A$ basic states after the n^{th} play.

State $S_1(n)$: $\tau_B \wedge \tau_A > n$. The game positions coincide and lie within W_η : $x_n = y_n \in W_\eta$.

State $S_2(n)$: $\tau_B \wedge \tau_A > n$. There is a closed disk $D_n \subseteq W_\eta$ such that

- (a) the radius of D_n is ϵ ;
- (b) for some $m < n$, the center of D_n is y_m ;
- (c) $x_n \in \partial D_n$;
- (d) $y_n \in \partial D_n$ and y_n is the point in D_n that is closest to the upper boundary of W_η .

State $S_3(n)$: $\tau_B \wedge \tau_A > n$. There is a closed disk $D_n \subseteq W_\eta$ such that

- (a) for some $k \geq 2$, the radius of D_n is $k\epsilon$;
- (b) for some $m < n$, the center of D_n is y_m ;
- (c) $x_n \in D_n$;
- (d) $y_n \in \partial D_n$ and y_n is the point in D_n that is closest to the upper boundary of W_η .

Claim : Suppose after the n^{th} play of the game, where $n \geq 1$, the games are in one of the states $S_1(n)$, $S_2(n)$ or $S_3(n)$.

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- $y_{n+1} \notin W_\eta$ and $\tau_B \leq \tau_A$.

- Case 1 current state $S_1(n)$. If player I wins he moves the token, in both games away, from boundary and the resulting state is $S_1(n+1)$
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- Case 2 current state $S_2(n)$. If player I wins the next play, he moves his game A position to the center y_m of D_n . Thus $x_{n+1} = y_{n+1} = y_m \in W_\eta$ and the state of the games is now $S_1(n+1)$.

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- Case 3. If player I wins, $S_2(n+1)$, else $S_3(n+1)$

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Neglecting technicalities, assume $u(x) = r^2 f(\theta) \geq 0$ is a solution to

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In polar coordinates it is known (Aronsson (1984)) that

$$\Delta_\infty u = \left[u_r^2 + \frac{1}{r^2} u_\theta^2 \right]^{-2} \left[u_r^2 u_{rr} + \frac{2}{r^2} u_r u_\theta u_{r\theta} + \frac{1}{r^4} u_\theta^2 u_{\theta\theta} - \frac{1}{r^3} u_r u_\theta^2 \right].$$

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It is reasonable to assume f is symmetric and concave, and this suggest $f'(0) = 0$. Thus we consider (6) on $(0, \frac{\eta}{2})$ with

$$f'(0) = 0, \quad f\left(\frac{\eta}{2}\right) = 0. \quad (7)$$

Making a functional transformation to convert this to a first order boundary value problem: Let

$$y = f \text{ and } a = f(0),$$

then transform via

$$H_a(y(x)) = (y'(x))^2. \quad (8)$$

This converts (6) into the equation

$$4y^2 [1 + 2y] + H_a(y) \left[1 + 6y + \frac{1}{2} H'_a(y) \right] = 0, \quad (9)$$

and since

$$H_a(a) = H_a(y(0)) = (y'(0))^2,$$

the condition (7) implies that

$$H_a(a) = 0. \quad (10)$$

We get an implicit representation of $y = f(\theta)$:

$$\theta = \int_{y(\theta)}^a \frac{dw}{\sqrt{H_a(w)}}, \quad \theta \in \left(0, \frac{\eta}{2}\right).$$

In particular,

$$\begin{aligned} \frac{\eta}{2} &= \int_{y(\eta/2)}^a \frac{dw}{\sqrt{H_a(w)}} \\ &= \int_0^a \frac{dw}{\sqrt{H_a(w)}}. \end{aligned} \tag{11}$$

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To evaluate this limit, it is necessary to make one more change of variables:

$$G_a(y) = (ay)^{-2}H_a(ay), \quad 0 < y < 1.$$

Thanks for a great FPD!